# 2NC---UKRR---R2

## Spec

### Spec---2NC

#### The 2AC Dropped a definition. Didn’t have a counterinterp since the aff has to be topical. Conceded that ‘the’ mandates specification. The plan doesn’t meet because they dropped the second half of our interpretation that ‘the usfg’ must be the three branches.

#### Concede reasonability. Doesn’t implicate the drop since it’s a way to compare between definitions. Concede substnacer.

#### Dispo is a voter is backwards.

#### Topic unworkable and

#### Neg flex. The alternative is uncondo. Dispo is a concession to the 1AC because they can choose.

#### Illogical. Resolution.

## K

### Kick---2NC

#### We’re not going for the alt, so concede the perm and framework.

#### Concede the perm. Theory reject the argument. Is better because reasonability. Dispo means it’s a sufficient kick condition.

#### The link separately turns the case. It proves the plan deradicalizes labor, which makes solvency impossible. That means it’s a linear DA that complicates both advantages and results in their inequality impact being a neg add on.

#### It also turns democracy. Breznik says labor law expansion causes corporatism that deletes the working class.

#### That means it’s not key to a global transition. You can’t go from the AFF to radical labor organizing. Short-term policymaking trades off with broad class consciousness needed for movements.

Kim Moody 22, senior research fellow at the University of Hertfordshire, founder of Labor Notes and author of several books on labor and politics, “Worker insurgency and the New Deal”, https://tempestmag.org/2022/12/worker-insurgency-and-the-new-deal/

In a different vein, Blanc seems to offer us some contemporary political choices: “Pro-union Democratic politics is better than neoliberal centrism or Republicanism, but independent working-class politics is far better still.” 72 Actually, “independent working-class politics” and organization aren’t simply “far better.” They are fundamentally different in their class content, political independence, democratic organization, grassroots base, and orientation toward increasing working-class power and undermining and eventually eliminating capitalist power. There can be a range and variety of working-class policies, but there isn’t some conventional poli-sci continuum from right to left along which to choose working-class politics. We can’t simply work our way incrementally from the merely “better” liberal capitalist politics to the “far better” working-class politics. There are class lines. Ruptures to be made. The choice is a qualitative one.

Since the qualitative choice of working-class politics appears (too?) difficult today, Blanc opts for the “better” one of “Pro-union Democratic politics.” Yet, whatever one thinks the reasons for this were, it was precisely the submergence of the rising labor movement of the mid-1930s into the “better” New Deal Democratic Party that was forged in 1936 and deepened thereafter that explains why there is, as Blanc reminds us, an “absence of a mass working-class politics” in the United States. This situation didn’t come out of nowhere. It involved political choices, organization, and struggle—not the tyranny of public opinion or some inevitable outcomes of the U.S. political system that left organized labor and the working-class in the United States as a junior partner (soon turned poor relative) without a political force of its own.

#### Organized labor movements solve the case---but top-down labor reform gets circumvented.

Dr. Eric Blanc 25, PhD in Sociology from New York University, Assistant Professor of Labor Studies at Rutgers University, “WE ARE THE UNION: How Worker-to-Worker Organizing Is Revitalizing Labor and Winning Big”, University of California Press

Assessing that OUR Walmart wasn’t worth the cost, the UFCW eventually dropped its financial support. Most other unions have similarly thrown in the towel on any form of ambitious campaigning beyond the electoral arena. The dominant conclusion among US union leaders—at least those at all interested in dynamics beyond their local fiefdoms—was (and remains) that widespread unionization will only become a reality after labor law reform. Therefore unions in the meantime should double down on electing Democrats and lobbying for legislative changes.

Union leaders are right that this country needs better labor laws— including, as SEIU leaders emphasize, to replace our narrow firm-based collective bargaining system with a broader sectoral bargaining regime, a step that could make it far easier to unionize in today’s decentralized context. The problem is that by downplaying deep workplace organizing in the meantime, a “policy first” strategy makes transformative legal reform less likely.

If history is any guide, national labor law reform won’t get passed without an organizing effervescence that creates intractable crises for economic and political elites. Absent such pressure, labor’s half dozen attempts at labor law reform since the late 1970s have failed to overcome Republican intransigence and Democratic insipidity. And even were Congress able to get past the filibuster and pass transformative labor law reform, it’s all but guaranteed that our reactionary Supreme Court would shoot it down—unless a powerful insurgent movement compels it to retreat or compels a Democratic administration to pack the Court.

#### Concede leanarts. They’ve punted their wamring advantage.

Klaas Lenaerts et al. 22, Klaas Lenaerts is a Research Analyst at Bruegel and holds a Master in Economics from the KU Leuven and in European Economic Studies from the College of Europe; Simone Tagliapietra is Senior fellow at Bruegel and Professor of Energy, Climate and Environmental Policy at the Catholic University of Milan and at The Johns Hopkins University - School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Europe; Guntram B. Wolff served as the CEO of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and Otto-Wolff-Director of its Research Institute since August 2022, also heads the Center for Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Technology, was director of Bruegel until June 2022, a Brussels-based institute on economic policy in Europe, and teaches at the Solvay School of Economics and Management of the Université Libre de Bruxelles, “Fighting Climate Change Requires Strong Green Growth Policies and Trade, Not Degrowth,” Reglobalisation: Changing Patterns, edited by Ernest Gnan et al., 1. Auflage, facultas, 2022, pp. 265–274

Fortunately, there are good reasons to believe that much faster decarbonisation of global energy production is increasingly feasible. Over the last few decades, the EU, the US and other developed countries put in place substantial incentive schemes for renewable energy deployment, such as feed-in-tariffs schemes (IEA, 2020a). These measures have spurred a large-scale deployment of solar and wind energy technology, which pushed their costs down by 85% and 68% respectively over the last decade, ultimately making them cost-competitive vis-a-vis traditional energy sources even without subsidies (Figure 2). Both economies have achieved absolute decoupling, even when accounting for ‘consumption-based emissions’ abroad, albeit not yet at a sufficient speed (Friedlingstein et al, 2020). This success story now provides an opportunity to emerging and developing economies to power their economic growth also on the basis of competitive green technologies (IEA, 2021b).

## Labor

### Circumvention---T/L---2NC

The plan does nothing. Empirics prove employers will just opt out of contracts AND wage setting standards don’t consult workers at all. Prefer Vernuccio, which cites the largest group of labor unions. Frame for circumvention: assume maximal bad faith under Trump. He’d try to lessen the impact on businesses as much as possible. It doesn’t matter if wage boards exist, because they have the exact same problem: they only get to fiat that contracts are extended not that they’re enforced or that CBAs are followed through in good faith.

#### Independently, The NLRB is toothless to enforce violations. Companies can relocate to within 5th circuit jurisdiction. Our Meyerson evidence says that means they have ‘complete leeway’ to skirt enforcement. That kills solvency because the 1AC is conditional: their plan says that they implement worker boards “upon the request” of organizations, but if companies crack down, requests will be suppressed. That’s Presumption! They’ll crack down.

#### Not facilitating is irerel.

#### Durable fiat cant solve since effect not mandate. Bad way to understand politics that ignores real world costs.

### Circumvention---AT: Cost Saving---2NC

#### ‘Cost-saving’ is comparative to effective firm-based bargaining, which their 1AC ‘unions low now’ evidence says is not the squo.

#### Deven, open the card doc!

#### Framing issue: they contravene the conclusion.

Matthias **Jacobs &** Matthias **Münder 22** – Professor of Civil Law, Labour Law and Law of Civil Procedure at Bucerius Law School & Doctorate from Bucerius Law School. “A Worthy Import?: Examining the Advantages and Disadvantages of Sectoral Collective Bargaining in Germany,” 09/26/2022, International Center for Law and Economics, <https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/German-Sectoral-Bargaining.pdf>

III. Conclusion: Relevance for the United States Sectoral collective bargaining has played, and will continue to play, a significant role in the employment world, even if the prevalence of sectoral collective-bargaining agreements is steadily waning. Whether an employer opts into sectoral collective bargaining is a matter of weighing the pros and cons of such a scheme, as discussed here. Every employer must decide for itself whether the advantages of these agreements outweigh the disadvantages. From the perspective of a forward-looking company that values flexibility and wants to offer employment terms that are specific and tailored to its business, there is much to recommend not subjecting one’s terms and conditions of employment to sectoral collective bargaining, unless the agreements in question provide enough in the way of savings clauses that permit more flexible (temporary or long-term) management of certain parts of the agreement that govern terms and conditions of employment In sum, the challenges associated with sectoral bargaining in Germany are noteworthy. Policymakers in the United States who seek to import such a model would do well to understand these challenges arising in Germany.

#### Immediately after they stopped, it concludes that sectoral bargaining is impossible to enforce.

Matthias **Jacobs &** Matthias **Münder 22** – Professor of Civil Law, Labour Law and Law of Civil Procedure at Bucerius Law School & Doctorate from Bucerius Law School. “A Worthy Import?: Examining the Advantages and Disadvantages of Sectoral Collective Bargaining in Germany,” 09/26/2022, International Center for Law and Economics, <https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/German-Sectoral-Bargaining.pdf>

It is **costly** and **difficult** to prepare for and conduct collective-bargaining negotiations. The union’s demands must be reviewed by counsel, and their feasibility and ramifications must be analyzed from a practical standpoint. The employer’s side must develop its own position on what it would like to have in the collective-bargaining agreement. It must seek advice on whether (and how) those goals can be achieved with legal certainty and how the agreement would affect the company. It also needs to develop a strategy and narrative for both the interval leading up to the negotiations and the negotiations themselves.

As these activities crop up, a company or enterprise that manages its labor relations by means of firm-specific collective bargaining is required to **employ specialists** or resort to a **significant volume** of **external support**.28 Companies pursuing firm-specific collective-bargaining agreements, therefore, **incur expenses** and could require **additional hiring**.

Consequently, one advantage of sectoral collective bargaining, from the employer’s perspective, is that such negotiations need not be conducted in-house. Instead, these **tasks are unloaded** onto an association or federation of employers that bundles collective bargaining on behalf of all members so that the association or federation’s central collective-bargaining division will adequately represent the employers’ interests, while simultaneously managing the administrative tasks associated with bargaining. Even if the employers pay dues to the organization, this approach creates **cost savings**, because the **costs are distributed** across the entire membership. The more centralized the conduct of negotiations and the broader the scope of a collective-bargaining agreement, the **lower the transaction costs** for the employers.29

**<<<Dartmouth Card Ends>>>**

Agreements are neither tailored nor flexible As a rule, sectoral collective-bargaining agreements apply to all member companies and enterprises in each region—e.g., to the metals and electronics-industry firms in the state of Bavaria. This means they apply both to companies and enterprises in densely populated areas with a lot of industry and high costs of living, as well as to those in rural areas. Additionally, sectoral collective-bargaining agreements apply to large organizations with several thousand employees, as well as to a smaller mid-sized company with only 50 employees.30

It is, therefore, practically impossible for a one-size-fits-all sectoral collective bargaining agreement to promulgate employment terms that would be appropriate for all kinds of businesses. Differently sized employers that make different products in different locations do not necessarily expect the same outcomes when they commit their terms and conditions of employment to collective bargaining. In addition, the businesses within a broadly defined sector will vary in terms of profitability, depending on which subsector of the economy they are deemed a part of. This can make it challenging for a less-profitable business to fund payroll increases geared toward companies in the same sector that enjoy greater financial success.31 Belonging to an association or federation of employers can, therefore, exacerbate a less profitable company’s financial situation.

#### Complexity means firms will opt out.

Matthias **2AC Jacobs &** Matthias **Münder 22** – Professor of Civil Law, Labour Law and Law of Civil Procedure at Bucerius Law School & Doctorate from Bucerius Law School. “A Worthy Import?: Examining the Advantages and Disadvantages of Sectoral Collective Bargaining in Germany,” 09/26/2022, International Center for Law and Economics, <https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/German-Sectoral-Bargaining.pdf>

Sectoral collective bargaining, or rather its sum total—the aggregation of various sectoral collective-bargaining agreements—keeps growing in complexity. One can only speculate as to why. One factor will be the desire, on the part of both employer and employee, for more flexibility in the employment relationship. The complexity of the arrangements is a major challenge for small and mid-sized companies and enterprises. Locally and in a decentralized manner, with small human-resources departments, they must implement sectoral collective-bargaining agreements that were negotiated by large, dedicated commissions. And often for a business, it may not elect to abide only by select parts of the aggregation of agreements. Employers instead face an all-or-nothing situation: either they implement the entire, complex body of agreements as an association or federation member, or they do not participate as members constrained by collective bargaining. The leading federation for labor and social policy for the entire German economy—the Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände [Confederation of German Employers’ Associations]—has acknowledged the problem of the complexity of these bodies of agreements.41 One solution it has proposed is to permit companies and enterprises to select individual modules from the group of agreements, like building blocks. For that to happen, an employer’s association must strike a corresponding arrangement in a collective-bargaining agreement with the union. Jörg Hofmann—head of the large and powerful union IG Metall—however, recently rejected such a proposal.42

#### They prodicted Jacobs in cross x, so they can’t answer any of these arguments in the 1AR.

#### Abt germany is wrong.

#### Bruenig card is before the recent decision. Its ust about selia.

### Turn---2NC

#### The 2AC sped through t the case, which is a nuke because We’re link turning every advatnage: first: Labor.

#### Yes uniqueness.

#### Unions torch productivity and intensify inequality.

#### 1. Labor mobility.

#### a. Wage floors and seniority rules trap workers in failing sectors instead of reallocating. Even when u have strike rights, minimum wage acts as a price ceiling, resulting in rest unemployment. People will stop working for as long as they can, creating a spell of antiproductivity. Wage coordination does NOT solve.

#### Sectoral bargaining crushes worker power. It *puts the cart before the horse* and is turned by employers into a tool of austerity*.*

Eric Blanc 23. Professor of labor studies at Rutgers University. "Should the Labor Movement Prioritize the Push for Sectoral Bargaining?." The Nation. 3-3-2023. https://www.thenation.com/article/activism/sectoral-bargaining-labor-unions/

Sectoral bargaining is a desirable goal, but prioritizing this fight puts the cart before the horse. The labor movement currently faces a far more urgent task: organizing unorganized workers into unions.

Increasing employees’ collective power on the ground is the most realistic path to bringing bosses from across an industry to the bargaining table. US labor leaders too often treat sectoral bargaining as a strategic alternative to the daunting work of organizing workers shop by shop. But hoping for a quick policy fix overlooks the fact that centralized negotiations in Europe largely arose as a response from employers hoping to tame powerful local unions and strike militancy. And once European labor movements found themselves on the retreat in the 1990s, centralized bargaining was often either scrapped or came to serve as a mechanism to impose austerity and deregulation.

Without a bedrock of worker associational power, sectoral bargaining is unlikely to get widely implemented—at least not in a manner favorable to working people.

#### b. Shocks results in efficient markets, but insulating unions from productivity shocks prevents reallocation. The result is longer unemployment spells, wage compression, and structural inefficiency.

Fernando Alvarez 24. University of Chicago. Robert Shimer, University of Chicago. and Fabrice Tourre. Baruch College. "Unions: Wage floors, seniority rules, and unemployment duration." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 169 (2024): 104965.

Our work analyzes the impact of unions on unemployment and wage dynamics in a model whose building blocks rely on the canonical work of Lucas and Prescott (1974). By imposing a minimum wage and seniority rule, unions cause rest unemployment, with recently laid-off workers intentionally staying within an under-performing labor market with the hope of regaining employment as the conditions improve. Hazard rates out of unemployment are thus steeply downward sloping, with many short jobless spells as well as few long ones, with an average unemployment duration that increases with the level of minimum wage. Unionized labor markets in our model feature wage compression — and in the extreme case where the minimum wage binds all the time, a constant wage rate irrespective of the evolution of sectorial productivity. Seniority rules, by backloading workers' payoff into the future, reduce the overall level of unemployment, relative to an alternative rule where jobs are allocated randomly to workers, thereby improving efficiency. While not the focus of our work, one could envision other job-worker allocation mechanisms, effectively assigning property rights to workers so as to alter their incentives to enter and exit labor markets, ultimately reducing further unemployment. Our theory and model predictions should be viewed as a starting point for the study of the influence of unions on labor market dynamics, as the increasing empirical evidence (see for instance Bhuller et al. (2022)) suggests that today's collective bargaining systems feature significant degrees of heterogeneity across OECD countries.

#### c. The plan kills competitiveness.

Matthias **2AC Jacobs &** Matthias **Münder 22** – Professor of Civil Law, Labour Law and Law of Civil Procedure at Bucerius Law School & Doctorate from Bucerius Law School. “A Worthy Import?: Examining the Advantages and Disadvantages of Sectoral Collective Bargaining in Germany,” 09/26/2022, International Center for Law and Economics, <https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/German-Sectoral-Bargaining.pdf>

Opting into sectoral collective bargaining has far-reaching consequences. Once an employer has opted into sectoral collective bargaining, it will have a tough time later if it seeks to extricate itself from the terms and conditions of employment under the agreement.34 This can become especially problematic if the company’s finances take a turn for the worse. A company or enterprise also may find itself in an internationally competitive environment that makes it imperative to react with maximum flexibility, and in a decentralized way, to challenges created by innovative products and technologies.

In principle, an employer is constrained by a sectoral collective-bargaining agreement if it is a member of the employers’ association, and the agreement is effective. If an employer decides to leave the association or federation of employers before the agreedupon expiry of the collective-bargaining agreement, section 3, para. 3 of the TVG binds the employer to the terms of the agreement through the end of the agreement’s term. This principle is known as the “continuing commitment” (Nachbindung). Thus, until the collective-bargaining agreement has expired, an employer cannot deviate from the agreement to the employees’ disadvantage, despite no longer belonging to the association or federation and even if its own workforce agrees to the change. In the short term, it can be unpleasant to be tied to collectively bargained salary and wage schedules, which usually run for a few years at a time. From an employer’s perspective, however, it can be significantly more uncomfortable to be bound to collective-bargaining agreements with open-ended or unlimited timeframes.36 For example, employers will often enter into open-ended collectivebargaining agreements that lock in basic elements of the employment framework, such as paid vacation or long notice periods for terminations or layoffs, for decades at a time. Such agreements are risky for employers because they never “end,” and the “continuing commitment” only ends upon the agreement’s expiration date. There is a debate in the labor and employment-law literature over when this potentially “perpetual constraint” ought to terminate.37 As a matter of current law, however, the Bundesarbeitsgericht [Federal Labor Court] has rejected these considerations.

#### d. 1AC Domash concludes neg.

Alex Domash 21, Research Fellow, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government, Harvard Kennedy School, “Returning Power to American Workers and Raising Wages: How Collective Bargaining Reform Can Help Restore America’s Middle Class,” 03/2021, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/cid/files/publications/CID\_Wiener\_Inequality%20Award%20Research/Policy%20Report\_Alex%20Domash%20(1-A).pdf.

But economic theory cautions that some collective bargaining arrangements can introduce market distortions that hinder economic performance. One influential model of collective bargaining, the “right-to-manage” model, makes a distinction between “insiders” and “outsiders” (Leontief, 1946). According to this model, workers bargain exclusively over their own wages, and therefore set the wage above market equilibrium, which helps workers covered by collective bargaining agreements at the expense of lower employment opportunities for job-seekers outside of the firm. Some collective bargaining agreements also have the additional downside of reducing the flexibility of firms to respond to macroeconomic and productivity shocks (OECD, 2019).

2. Independently, Unions are wage-setting monopolies---they inflates wages above market, firms cut jobs, and growth collapses. This creates a wage/employment split that is classic monopoly behavior. That’s Azar. It turns their internal links:

#### Unions suppress wages, cementing inequality.

George Reisman 25. Ph.D. Pepperdine University Professor Emeritus of Economics. “How Labor Unions Can Be Anti-Labor.” Capitalism. September 9, 2025. https://capitalismmagazine.com/2025/09/labor-unions-are-anti-labor/

Labor unions and the general public almost totally ignore the essential role played by falling prices in achieving rising real wages. They see only the rise in money wages as worthy of consideration. Indeed, in our environment of chronic inflation, prices that actually do fall are relatively rare.

Nevertheless, the only thing that can explain a rise in real wages throughout the economic system is a fall in prices relative to wages. And the only thing that achieves this is an increase in production per worker. More production per worker — a higher productivity of labor — serves to increase the supply of goods and services produced relative to the supply of labor that produces them. In this way, it reduces prices relative to wages and thereby raises real wages and the general standard of living.

What raises money wages throughout the economic system is not what is responsible for the rise in real wages. Increases in money wages are essentially the result just of the increase in the quantity of money and resulting increase in the overall volume of spending in the economic system. In the absence of a rising productivity of labor, the increase in money and spending would operate to raise prices by as much or more than it raised wages. This outcome is prevented only by the fact that at the same time that the quantity of money and volume of spending are increasing, the output per worker is also increasing, with the result that prices rise by less than wages. A fall in prices is still present in the form of prices being lower than they would have been had only an increase in the quantity of money and volume of spending been operative.

With relatively minor exceptions, real wages throughout the economic system simply do not rise from the side of higher money wages. Essentially, they rise only from the side of a greater supply of goods and services relative to the supply of labor and thus from prices being lower relative to wages. The truth is that the means by which the standard of living of the individual wage earner and the individual businessman and capitalist is increased, and the means by which that of the average wage earner in the economic system is increased, are very different. For the individual, it is the earning of more money. For the average wage earner in the economic system, it is the payment of lower prices.

What this discussion shows is that the increase in money wages that labor unions seek is not at all the source of rising real wages and that the source of rising real wages is in fact a rising productivity of labor, which always operates from the side of falling prices, not rising money wages.

Indeed, the efforts of labor unions to raise money wages are profoundly opposed to the goal of raising real wages and the standard of living. When the unions seek to raise the standard of living of their members by means of raising their money wages, their policy inevitably comes down to an attempt to make the labor of their members artificially scarce. That is their only means of raising the wages of their members. The unions do not have much actual power over the demand for labor. But they often achieve considerable power over the supply of labor. And their actual technique for raising wages is to make the supply of labor, at least in the particular industry or occupation that a given union is concerned with, as scarce as possible.

Thus, whenever they can, unions attempt to gain control over entry into the labor market. They seek to impose apprenticeship programs, or to have licensing requirements imposed by the government. Such measures are for the purpose of holding down the supply of labor in the field and thereby enabling those fortunate enough to be admitted to it, to earn higher incomes. Even when the unions do not succeed in directly reducing the supply of labor, the imposition of their above-market wage demands still has the effect of reducing the number of jobs offered in the field and thus the supply of labor in the field that is able to find work.

The artificial wage increases imposed by the labor unions result in unemployment when above-market wages are imposed throughout the economic system. This situation exists when it is possible for unions to be formed easily. If, as in the present-day United States, all that is required is for a majority of workers in an establishment to decide that they wish to be represented by a union, then the wages imposed by the unions will be effective even in the nonunion fields.

Employers in the nonunion fields will feel compelled to offer their workers wages comparable to what the union workers are receiving — indeed, possibly even still higher wages — in order to ensure that they do not unionize.

Widespread wage increases closing large numbers of workers out of numerous occupations put extreme pressure on the wage rates of whatever areas of the economic system may still remain open. These limited areas could absorb the overflow of workers from other lines at low enough wage rates. But minimum-wage laws prevent wage rates in these remaining lines from going low enough to absorb these workers.

From the perspective of most of those lucky enough to keep their jobs, the most serious consequence of the unions is the holding down or outright reduction of the productivity of labor. With few exceptions, the labor unions openly combat the rise in the productivity of labor. They do so virtually as a matter of principle. They oppose the introduction of labor-saving machinery on the grounds that it causes unemployment. They oppose competition among workers. As Henry Hazlitt pointed out, they force employers to tolerate featherbedding practices, such as the classic requirement that firemen, whose function was to shovel coal on steam locomotives, be retained on diesel locomotives. They impose make-work schemes, such as requiring that pipe delivered to construction sites with screw thread already on it, have its ends cut off and new screw thread cut on the site. They impose narrow work classifications and require that specialists be employed at a day’s pay to perform work that others could easily do — for example, requiring the employment of a plasterer to repair the incidental damage done to a wall by an electrician, which the electrician himself could easily repair.

To anyone who understands the role of the productivity of labor in raising real wages, it should be obvious that the unions’ policy of combating the rise in the productivity of labor renders them in fact a leading enemy of the rise in real wages. However radical this conclusion may seem, however much at odds it is with the prevailing view of the unions as the leading source of the rise in real wages over the last hundred and fifty years or more, the fact is that in combating the rise in the productivity of labor, the unions actively combat the rise in real wages!

#### It lowers wage gains.

F. Vincent Vernuccio 21. Senior fellow at the Mackinac Center for Public Policy in Midland, Mich., and president of the Institute for the American Worker. "Sectoral bargaining is bad for workers and the American economy." Hill. 4-17-2021. https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/548054-sectoral-bargaining-is-bad-for-workers-and-the-american-economy/

One of its top lawyers explained: The Connecticut bill would “de facto be creating a third category of worker” — neither an employee nor an independent contractor. The labor federation prefers a national version of California’s AB5 law, which makes it difficult for independent workers to work for themselves. (Many independent workers have noted that the law has hurt them.)

Bill Samuel, the AFL-CIO’s top lobbyist, previously raised concerns that sectoral bargaining also could undermine pay and benefits negotiated through current union contracts. While some union officials think that a one-size-fits-all approach would harm their sales pitch to current and prospective members, advocates of sectoral bargaining have a different focus. The House Democrats’ report from the labor committee recommended it as a way of “eliminating the perceived competitive disadvantage from unionization.”

Lost in this conversation are the preferences of workers. Polling data repeatedly have shown that gig workers prefer to be their own boss. And under sectoral bargaining, employees in unionized industries would have a harder time getting raises by switching jobs, since all employers would pay the same.

Sectoral bargaining would take flexibility and competition out of large parts of the American economy. The likely results: wage stagnation for employees, fewer options for job creators and independent workers, and higher prices for everyone.

### Impact---AT: Inequality---2NC

#### Inequality is low.

No public goods impact. Society is resilient and have comprehensive solutions. Collapse results in less hierarchy and more egalitarianism, which means inequality is self correcting and prevents violence. That’s Jehn.

#### Inequality is unrelated to X-risk mitigation.

David Thorstad 23. PhD, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University, Senior Research Affiliate at the Global Priorities Institute, Oxford, and Research Affiliate at the Machine Intelligence and Normative Theory Lab, ANU. "High Risk, Low Reward: A Challenge to the Astronomical Value of Existential Risk Mitigation." Philosophy & Public Affairs, Volume 51, Issue 4, p. 393-394. Fall 2023. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/papa.12248

A different worry is that the Aschenbrenner result holds when resources are allocated optimally. As Aschenbrenner notes, this may not be the case. For one thing, safety is a global public good and theory predicts that global public goods will be **sharply undersupplied**.37 Even the largest countries bear only a fraction of global risk burdens, and each nation would prefer to leave existential risk reduction to **others**. Moreover, much of the disvalue of existential risks comes in their impact on the distant future, and there are good reasons to expect that **far-future value** will be **underpromoted**. Indeed, pessimists think that existential risk mitigation has been radically underfunded to date. **Aschenbrenner**’s model does address one reason why future value may be neglected, namely a positive rate of pure time preference. But it does not address the many other **motivational** **and institutional obstacles**, such as **cognitive bias**es and **short-term election** cycle**s**, which are often held up as obstacles to longtermist political decision-making.38 For these reasons, we might worry that even if an optimal resource allocation would bring an end to the time of perils, human societies may suboptimally allocate resources away from existential risk mitigation at the expense of continued peril.

#### The AFF is a ‘formula for stagnation’.

DB 19. "Sectoral collective bargaining is bad for the economy.” https://www.dailybreeze.com/2019/09/05/sectoral-collective-bargaining-is-bad-for-the-economy/?section\_index=1&section\_name=big\_story&te=1&nl=the-morning&emc=edit\_nn\_20200908&noamp=mobile

Sectoral bargaining means all the companies in a sector of the economy would be subject to the same contract terms either directly or through mandated "contract extensions," such as laws that require all companies to pay the "prevailing wage," typically the highest union wage in the region.

This eliminates wage competition between companies, and it also eliminates the ability of employers to offer higher wages to highly valuable employees or lower wages to inexperienced new hires. Every company covered by the agreement governing that sector must abide by the same pay and benefit rules.

Union leaders say sectoral bargaining would make it easier to organize workers who are not all in the same location, such as ride-share drivers or domestic workers who are employed in private homes.

The process of unionizing a company's workforce dates to the 1935 National Labor Relations Act. If 30 percent of workers in a workplace sign petitions asking for a union election, the National Labor Relations Board sets a time and place for the election to be held. A majority vote is enough to unionize the workforce and begin collective bargaining.

Federal law does not currently permit the sectoral bargaining that Sanders and others are advocating. State law is another story. California is one of three states — New Jersey and Colorado are the others — with laws that allow the governor to convene wage boards and bring together businesses and workers (represented by union leaders) to engage in bargaining for an entire industry. Although still on the books, the laws are old and inactive. California's wage-board mechanism, the Industrial Welfare Commission, has been defunded since 2004.

And rightly so.

Forcing uniformity on an entire sector of the economy is a formula for stagnation. Companies should have the right to determine compensation based on the labor market and the skills required, without being limited by some wider long-term agreement that binds their industry. Workers should have the right to accept a job without having to pay union dues as a condition of employment.

#### Says it’s zero.

Andreas **1ac Schmidt &** Duan **Jujin 21**. \*Faculty of Philosophy at the Centre for PPE at the University of Groningen. \*\*CE Delft. “Economic Inequality and the Long-Term Future.” https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Inequality-and-the-Long-Term-Future\_Andreas-Schmidt-and-Daan-Juijn-reupload.pdf

So, we can assess the instrumental character of income inequality in three different ways: we can focus on effects in the short term, the medium term (hundreds to thousands of years), or – adopting longtermism – all its future effects. It is not obvious that these three approaches converge. The lack of work on these questions constitutes a surprisingly large and important gap in the literature. This article makes a start filling this gap. To assess the instrumental benefits of equality/inequality, we use a time-discounted instrumentalist framework. We do not look for an optimal level of inequality. Instead, we consider how, at the margin, reducing or increasing economic inequality in today’s richer countries (roughly, OECD countries) would impact expected aggregate human wellbeing, other things equal. We vary our discount rate to check inequality’s effects along three timeframes, short, medium, and long term. We find a good short and medium-term instrumental case for lower economic inequality. We then argue – somewhat speculatively – that we have instrumental reasons for inequality reduction from a longtermist perspective too, because greater inequality could increase existential risk. We thus have instrumental reasons for reducing inequality, regardless of which time-horizon we take.

#### AND is about global inequality.

Andreas **1ac Schmidt &** Duan **Jujin 21**. \*Faculty of Philosophy at the Centre for PPE at the University of Groningen. \*\*CE Delft. “Economic Inequality and the Long-Term Future.” https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Inequality-and-the-Long-Term-Future\_Andreas-Schmidt-and-Daan-Juijn-reupload.pdf

For various reasons, we only focussed on domestic inequality. But we believe future research that would probe global inequality’s effects across different time scales and across different types of global inequality would be valuable. Researchers on global inequality commonly distinguish (i) between-country inequality that compares countries on their aggregate achievement (say aggregate income), (ii) between-country inequality that compares the average achievement of each country (for example GDP per capita), and (iii) world inequality that simply looks at economic inequality at the global level treating the world’s population like one country (Milanovic, 2011, 2016). Of course, we can also look at regional inequalities, such as within Asia or Europe, and use the three different measures within a region rather than the entire world.

Future work could probe how far instrumental effects identified at the domestic level extrapolate to the regional or global level (each time considering differences between (i), (ii), and (iii)). For example, the decreasing marginal utility effect should mostly apply globally too (the ‘perceived unfairness’ less so). Moreover, it might be that stark inequalities globally and within regions also diminish the institutional quality of national and international political organisations like the European Union. At the same time, some potential effects might be specific to the international arena. For example, addressing longtermist challenges like climate change or existential risk will require international coordination and cooperation. Stark between-country inequalities might make lower- income countries less willing to cooperate with richer countries to benefit future generations.34 Finally, if one goes beyond Instrumentalism, how to assess inequalities beyond nation states raises its own philosophical questions (Beitz, 2001). Most distributive egalitarians, for example, view both national and global inequalities as intrinsically bad (Caney, 2006). Relational views, on the other hand, hold that distributive inequalities are non-instrumentally bad in virtue of affecting social relations, and such relations are quite different within groups, regions, countries and across borders (Ip, 2016).

### Impact---AT: Slow Growth---2NC

#### ‘Slow growth’ is fake.

#### Thumpers like 08 and Covid disprove.

#### Other factors outweigh: there’s no intrinsic connection between GDP and military power, and massive military spending eliminates the risk of transition conflict. That’s Bradbury.

#### No impact to stagnation.

**Posen ’16** [Adam; March 2016; Government and Economics PhD from Harvard, economic advisor to the Congressional Budget Office, faculty of the World Economic Forum, consultant for the International Monetary Fund and the United States government; Peterson Institute for International Economics Briefing 16-3, Reality Check for the Global Economy, “Why We Need a Reality Check,” Ch. 1]

Greater confidence in the world economy’s resilience and near-term prospects is justified. Market fears about the ability of policy to stabilize growth and promote inflation, if understandable, are exaggerated or in some cases unfounded. All the more reason then not to allow ourselves to be distracted by a financial market tail wagging the macroeconomic dog. At a fundamental level, most of the major economies, starting with China and the United States, are growing more sustainably now than a decade ago, at their slower rates. That growth is not built on rising private or public leverage, with the notable exception of China—and even in China some restructuring is under way with ample savings to cushion the process. Even where the situation is not so rosy, many in the markets seem to be confusing strains and suboptimal situations with acute instability, not just for Italian banks and for Brazilian budgets but also for Latin America more generally or for trends in global trade. A more normal muddling through with poor but stable conditions is a far better bet. And where some in the markets moving prices fear that normal economic laws have been reversed—that monetary policy is ineffective or that low oil prices are on net harmful—they are likely to be proven clearly wrong, as they were previously on inflation and commodity prices. Having some clarity to distinguish between the more solid underlying economic outlook and the shadows thrown by financial puppetry is critical to making the right policy decisions to avoid an unnecessary recession.

A combination of public policies and decentralized private-sector responses to the crisis have increased our economic resilience, diminished the systemic spillovers between economies, and even created some room for additional stimulus if needed. Large parts of the global financial system are better capitalized, monitored, and frankly more risk averse than they were a decade ago, with less leverage. The riskier parts of today’s global economy are less directly linked to the center’s growth and financing than when the troubles were within the United States and most of Europe in 2008. Trade imbalances of many key economies are smaller, though growing, and thus accumulations of foreign debt vulnerabilities are also smaller than a decade ago. Most central banks are now so committed to stabilization that they are attacked for being too loose or supportive of markets, making them at least unlikely to repeat some policy errors from 2007–10 of delaying loosening or even excessive tightening. Finally, corporate and household balance sheets are far more solid in the US and some other major economies than they were a decade ago (though not universally), and even in China the perceptions of balance sheet weakness exceed the reality in scope and scale.

immigration has dropped off. So there’s every reason to believe that we’ll fairly soon go back to an era of low interest rates.

#### Or it’ll be global, meaning there’s no impact to relative decline.

#### Oppenheimer’s writing about four forces, not just stagnation, AND says it’s thumped by a laundry list.

1AC Oppenheimer ’21 [Michael; 2021; Clinical Professor at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University, M.A. in International Affairs from the University of Virginia; The Future of Global Affairs, “The Turbulent Future of International Relations,” Ch. 2]

Four structural forces will shape the future of International Relations: globalization (but without liberal rules, institutions, and leadership)1; multipolarity (the end of American hegemony and wider distribution of power among states and non-states2); the strengthening of distinctive, national and subnational identities, as persistent cultural differences are accentuated by the disruptive effects of Western style globalization (what Samuel Huntington called the “non-westernization of IR”3); and secular economic stagnation, a product of longer term global decline in birth rates combined with aging populations.4 These structural forces do not determine everything. Environmental events, global health challenges, internal political developments, policy mistakes, technology breakthroughs or failures, will intersect with structure to define our future. But these four structural forces will impact the way states behave, in the capacity of great powers to manage their differences, and to act collectively to settle, rather than exploit, the inevitable shocks of the next decade.

Some of these structural forces could be managed to promote prosperity and avoid war. Multipolarity (inherently more prone to conflict than other configurations of power, given coordination problems)5 plus globalization can work in a world of prosperity, convergent values, and effective conflict management. The Congress of Vienna system achieved relative peace in Europe over a hundred-year period through informal cooperation among multiple states sharing a fear of populist revolution. It ended decisively in 1914. Contemporary neoliberal institutionalists, such as John Ikenberry, accept multipolarity as our likely future, but are confident that globalization with liberal characteristics can be sustained without American hegemony, arguing that liberal values and practices have been fully accepted by states, global institutions, and private actors as imperative for growth and political legitimacy.6 Divergent values plus multipolarity can work, though at significantly lower levels of economic growth-in an autarchic world of isolated units, a world envisioned by the advocates of decoupling, including the current American president.7 Divergent values plus globalization can be managed by hegemonic power, exemplified by the decade of the 1990s, when the Washington Consensus, imposed by American leverage exerted through the IMF and other U.S. dominated institutions, overrode national differences, but with real costs to those states undergoing “structural adjustment programs,”8 and ultimately at the cost of global growth, as states—especially in Asia—increased their savings to self insure against future financial crises.9

But all four forces operating simultaneously will produce a future of increasing internal polarization and cross border conflict, diminished economic growth and poverty alleviation, weakened global institutions and norms of behavior, and reduced collective capacity to confront emerging challenges of global warming, accelerating technology change, nuclear weapons innovation and proliferation. As in any effective scenario, this future is clearly visible to any keen observer. We have only to abolish wishful thinking and believe our own eyes.10

Secular Stagnation

This unbrave new world has been emerging for some time, as US power has declined relative to other states, especially China, global liberalism has failed to deliver on its promises, and totalitarian capitalism has proven effective in leveraging globalization for economic growth and political legitimacy while exploiting technology and the state’s coercive powers to maintain internal political control. But this new era was jumpstarted by the world financial crisis of 2007, which revealed the bankruptcy of unregulated market capitalism, weakened faith in US leadership, exacerbated economic deprivation and inequality around the world, ignited growing populism, and undermined international liberal institutions. The skewed distribution of wealth experienced in most developed countries, politically tolerated in periods of growth, became intolerable as growth rates declined. A combination of aging populations, accelerating technology, and global populism/nationalism promises to make this growth decline very difficult to reverse. What Larry Summers and other international political economists have come to call “secular stagnation” increases the likelihood that illiberal globalization, multipolarity, and rising nationalism will define our future. Summers11 has argued that the world is entering a long period of diminishing economic growth. He suggests that secular stagnation “may be the defining macroeconomic challenge of our times.” Julius Probst, in his recent assessment of Summers’ ideas, explains:

…rich countries are ageing as birth rates decline and people live longer. This has pushed down real interest rates because investors think these trends will mean they will make lower returns from investing in future, making them more willing to accept a lower return on government debt as a result.

Other factors that make investors similarly pessimistic include rising global inequality and the slowdown in productivity growth…

This decline in real interest rates matters because economists believe that to overcome an economic downturn, a central bank must drive down the real interest rate to a certain level to encourage more spending and investment… Because real interest rates are so low, Summers and his supporters believe that the rate required to reach full employment is so far into negative territory that it is effectively impossible.

…in the long run, more immigration might be a vital part of curing secular stagnation. Summers also heavily prescribes increased government spending, arguing that it might actually be more prudent than cutting back – especially if the money is spent on infrastructure, education and research and development.

Of course, governments in Europe and the US are instead trying to shut their doors to migrants. And austerity policies have taken their toll on infrastructure and public research. This looks set to ensure that the next recession will be particularly nasty when it comes… Unless governments change course radically, we could be in for a sobering period ahead.12

The rise of nationalism/populism is both cause and effect of this economic outlook. Lower growth will make every aspect of the liberal order more difficult to resuscitate post-Trump. Domestic politics will become more polarized and dysfunctional, as competition for diminishing resources intensifies. International collaboration, ad hoc or through institutions, will become politically toxic. Protectionism, in its multiple forms, will make economic recovery from “secular stagnation” a heavy lift, and the liberal hegemonic leadership and strong institutions that limited the damage of previous downturns, will be unavailable. A clear demonstration of this negative feedback loop is the economic damage being inflicted on the world by Trump’s trade war with China, which— despite the so-called phase one agreement—has predictably escalated from negotiating tactic to imbedded reality, with no end in sight. In a world already suffering from inadequate investment, the uncertainties generated by this confrontation will further curb the investments essential for future growth. Another demonstration of the intersection of structural forces is how populist-motivated controls on immigration (always a weakness in the hyper-globalization narrative) deprives developed countries of Summers’ recommended policy response to secular stagnation, which in a more open world would be a win-win for rich and poor countries alike, increasing wage rates and remittance revenues for the developing countries, replenishing the labor supply for rich countries experiencing low birth rates.

Illiberal Globalization

Economic weakness and rising nationalism (along with multipolarity) will not end globalization, but will profoundly alter its character and greatly reduce its economic and political benefits. Liberal global institutions, under American hegemony, have served multiple purposes, enabling states to improve the quality of international relations and more fully satisfy the needs of their citizens, and provide companies with the legal and institutional stability necessary to manage the inherent risks of global investment. But under present and future conditions these institutions will become the battlegrounds—and the victims—of geopolitical competition. The Trump Administration’s frontal attack on multilateralism is but the final nail in the coffin of the Bretton Woods system in trade and finance, which has been in slow but accelerating decline since the end of the Cold War. Future American leadership may embrace renewed collaboration in global trade and finance, macroeconomic management, environmental sustainability and the like, but repairing the damage requires the heroic assumption that America’s own identity has not been fundamentally altered by the Trump era (four years or eight matters here), and by the internal and global forces that enabled his rise. The fact will remain that a sizeable portion of the American electorate, and a monolithically proTrump Republican Party, is committed to an illiberal future. And even if the effects are transitory, the causes of weakening global collaboration are structural, not subject to the efforts of some hypothetical future US liberal leadership. It is clear that the US has lost respect among its rivals, and trust among its allies. While its economic and military capacity is still greatly superior to all others, its political dysfunction has diminished its ability to convert this wealth into effective power.13 It will furthermore operate in a future system of diffusing material power, diverging economic and political governance approaches, and rising nationalism. Trump has promoted these forces, but did not invent them, and future US Administrations will struggle to cope with them.

What will illiberal globalization look like? Consider recent events. The instruments of globalization have been weaponized by strong states in pursuit of their geopolitical objectives. This has turned the liberal argument on behalf of globalization on its head. Instead of interdependence as an unstoppable force pushing states toward collaboration and convergence around market-friendly domestic policies, states are exploiting interdependence to inflict harm on their adversaries, and even on their allies. The increasing interaction across national boundaries that globalization entails, now produces not harmonization and cooperation, but friction and escalating trade and investment disputes.14 The Trump Administration is in the lead here, but it is not alone. Trade and investment friction with China is the most obvious and damaging example, precipitated by China’s long failure to conform to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, now escalated by President Trump into a trade and currency war disturbingly reminiscent of the 1930s that Bretton Woods was designed to prevent. Financial sanctions against Iran, in violation of US obligations in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA), is another example of the rule of law succumbing to geopolitical competition. Though more mercantilist in intent than geopolitical, US tariffs on steel and aluminum, and their threatened use in automotives, aimed at the EU, Canada, and Japan,15 are equally destructive of the liberal system and of future economic growth, imposed as they are by the author of that system, and will spread to others. And indeed, Japan has used export controls in its escalating conflict with South Korea 16 (as did China in imposing controls on rare earth,17 and as the US has done as part of its trade war with China). Inward foreign direct investment restrictions are spreading. The vitality of the WTO is being sapped by its inability to complete the Doha Round, by the proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements, and now by the Trump Administration’s hold on appointments to WTO judicial panels. It should not surprise anyone if, during a second term, Trump formally withdrew the US from the WTO. At a minimum it will become a “dead letter regime.”18

As such measures gain traction, it will become clear to states—and to companies—that a global trading system more responsive to raw power than to law entails escalating risk and diminishing benefits. This will be the end of economic globalization, and its many benefits, as we know it. It represents nothing less than the subordination of economic globalization, a system which many thought obeyed its own logic, to an international politics of zero-sum power competition among multiple actors with divergent interests and values. The costs will be significant: Bloomberg Economics estimates that the cost in lost US GDP in 2019- dollar terms from the trade war with China has reached $134 billion to date and will rise to a total of $316 billion by the end of 2020.19

### AT: Cyber---2NC

#### Cyber is a joke.

**No cyber impact:**

**1. Responses. Governments do patches instead of retaliating.**

**2. Time lag. Finding a weakness, crafting a retaliation, and waiting for a good time means everyone’s cooled down by the time we can respond.**

**3. Attribution. Impossible to escalate when we don’t know who we’re escalating against.**

**4. Precedent. Cyberattacks are associated with espionage, not damage, meaning states will abide by the principle to not escalate.**

**That’s Harding. Prefer our evidence. Theirs is speculative and ruined by alarmist confusion, inflating risk.**

**Decades of cyberattacks thump. Affirmative evidence is ruined by speculation and alarmism.**

Tom **Johansmeyer 23**. Political Science and International Relations PhD candidate at the University of Kent. Is the Fear of Cyberwar Worse Than Cyberwar Itself?" Lawfare. 11/15/2023. lawfaremedia.org/article/is-the-fear-of-cyberwar-worse-than-cyberwar-itself

Distinguishing Between Cyber Risk and Cyberwar

Cyberwar is a subset of systemic cyber risk, within the broader category of cyber risk. Aside from war, systemic scenarios include, among others, cloud outages and attacks on centralized software vendors (Kaseya is an example). While the prospect of cyberwar has been heightened by the war in Ukraine, which involves a cyber power, the **historical scholarship** sees the risk as quite **remote**—with **empirical ev**idence from the Russia-Ukraine conflict supporting this view.

Thomas Rid, political scientist at Johns Hopkins, offers the classic starting point for contextual discussions regarding the risk of cyberwar, famously declaring it likely **impossible** as far back as 2012, as it **lacked** the violence required by the Clausewitzian tradition. Although some of Rid’s claims have not stood the test of time, what may seem like holes in his argument are really more akin to pinpricks. For example, he says, “No cyber attack has ever damaged a building,” to explain that cyber cannot cause physical damage. The production problems at Norsk Hydro resulting from LockerGoga stand in contrast, but the lack of **scale** suggests that Rid **remains** substantially **correct**—with the **same** holding true for loss of **life**.

The first sentence of a response to Rid’s article from John Stone, political scientist at King’s College, London, reads, “Cyber war will take place!” But that sentence is followed quickly by “perhaps not, but my purpose here is to demonstrate that cyber war could take place.” That one word, italicized in the original text, effectively defangs the argument. Stone’s **potentiality** and the **alarmism** that also characterizes the work of Joe Reeder and Tommy Hall, who make the heavily qualified claim that there are “some accounts” that “literally millions of ransomware attacks go unreported,” **fail** to add up to the imminence of cyber-war risk. Such claims, though, support the **hyperbole** that has pushed its way into the public consciousness. Jon Lindsay, professor of international affairs and public policy at Georgia Tech, notes media accounts that likened Stuxnet to the “‘cyber equivalent of the dropping of the atom bomb,’” a position he identifies as a colorful characterization that could only serve to increase **confusion** over cyber capabilities and their potential impact. And it’s that sort of characterization that keeps the prospect of cyberwar top of mind, despite the fact that cyber operations have **yet** to play a significant role in a major armed conflict.

The natural starting point in examining a possible major role for cyber operations in armed conflict is the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, given that it is recent and involves a global cyber power. The other wars fought over the past two decades or so have generally involved states without significant cyber capabilities—Afghanistan and Iraq come to mind. Throughout the conflict in **Ukraine** so far, cyber operations have had a **limited impact**. Several high-profile attempts have been attempted by both sides, yet they have **not** amounted to any significant strategic gains.

Cyber has played minor roles in smaller conflicts, with cyber operations in the 2008 conflict in **Georgia** and the **2014** invasion of **Ukraine** serving as relevant examples. Russia’s cyber campaign during its war with Georgia consisted of attacks on “fifty-four news, government, and financial websites,” as part of an overall war effort described by U.S. Army Capt. Sarah White as “remarkable for its inclusion of a series of large-scale, overt cyberspace attacks that were relatively well synchronized with conventional military operations.” Yet the impact was still **minimal**, with “little effect on conventional forces.” White also noted that the attacks were “**not** decisive to the outcome of the conflict” and that the average denial of service lasted two hours and 15 minutes—with the longest lasting six hours. With outage as a point of comparison, cyberattacks on the Ukrainian power grid in 2015 left over 230,000 people without power for as long as six hours. Like the 2008 denials in Georgia, the impact can only be described as **underwhelming**.

Although the fact that these outages came from hostile acts should not be downplayed, the consequences **fail** to reach thresholds routinely experienced from **other causes**, such as natural events. Hurricane Ida left approximately 430,000 households in Louisiana without power for more than a week. Superstorm Sandy kept much of Hoboken (including me) without power for five days and caused 8.5 million power outages spanning 21 states. The comparatively rapid restoration of power to more than 1 million people after Hurricane Ian in 2022 was still measured in days rather than hours, with a similar outcome after Hurricane Irma in 2017. War requires some amount of scale, as Rid and others have observed, and it appears the cyberattacks sometimes considered “war” fall far short of the large-scale outages we experience regularly.

The measures of the scale of cyberattacks described above should signal to reinsurers that the threat of cyberwar is relatively **limited**. After all, reinsurers have decades of experience with property-catastrophe risks, over which they have absorbed far more loss than cyber has generated. In fact, insured losses from natural catastrophes reached $120 billion in 2022, according to Munich Re. That’s nearly 10 times the cyber insurance sector’s aggregate premium this year and approximately 30 percent of all cyber insurance that is outstanding worldwide. The fears of cyberwar are generally **unfounded**, but they persist. While many reinsurers have sought to exclude cyber-war risk, as discussed above, efforts to do so are uncertain due to questions about the consistency and reliability of the definitions they use: Some have indicated that the definitions of terms like “war” may be ambiguous. Further, such exclusions have yet to be meaningfully tested.

**Private pressure zeroes the likelihood of escalation or retaliation.**

Nori **Katagiri 24**. Professor of political science at the University of St. Louis. *How Liberal Democracies Defend Their Cyber Networks from Hackers*. Springer link. 57-76.

The tension between **escalation** and **operational control** is based on several factors. First, **opposition** to aggressive policy may come from victims who have to pay higher cyber insurance premiums and whose claims are **denied** by insurers that invoke **cyberwar exclusions**.45 After several insurers invoked war exclusions to deny claims by victims of high-profile attacks, including the 2017 NotPetya malware attack,46 the sense of uncertainty of insurance coverage had grown. The cyber insurance market has since been in a state of high volatility because some insurers have denied claims by triggering the war clause for exception. Premiums have **risen** in part because available data on risks are scarce, and consumer data constantly change. The scope of cyber risks vastly exceeds available coverage, and many policies do **not** cover all possible perils. As a result, **risk aversion** has **spread** across the insurance market and reduced the number of willing insurers to cover carriers that may become overwhelmed with claims if a catastrophic incident causes simultaneous losses across many policyholders.47 The shortage of adequate insurance is critical because people are getting more attacks than before. In this context, fears of escalation can be powerful enough to get people to **oppose** aggressive policy.

Second, opposition to democratic states’ aggressive policy may come from private owners of the network.48 They are **important** players here because they provide quality **human resources** to government operations and help **reduce** the cost of **training** personnel to develop tools in-house. In particular, ISPs play a role in the conduct of OCO by operating networks that most attacks transit. Thus, they can **assist** democratic states in the work of **deterrence**. However, if they partake in government operations, ISPs can become **targets** of retribution especially because they receive essentially no international legal protection from cyber attacks. Furthermore, opposition to aggressive operation may come from firms that do **not** want to break **domestic legislation**. In the **U**nited **S**tates, for instance, extensive federal criminal law addresses fraud that involves misuse of computers and email, interference in communications, and recording of dialing and routing information. For instance, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) bans unauthorized people from gaining access to government computers and those used by financial institutions, in order to defraud or harm them.49 Naturally, firms become **unwilling** to support government policy, and they are more likely to **refuse** to collaborate, so as to protect proprietary information and **corporate** and client **interests**. The chance of **retribution** and **legal concerns** can make it **difficult** for states to gain support from the private sector.

### Unions Fail---Democracy---2NC

#### Dartmouth is reading a democracy advantage under trump and attempting to claim that labor unions solve, which is a complete joke!

#### Frame for solvency. Their cards are highlightted to say literally nothing.

#### Unions ensure backsliding---they have the same addiction to power and top-down control as the political parties they claim to resist. That makes them structurally anti-democratic.

#### Pasrticipatory democracy key.

#### There’s no uniqueness: political participation is high.

Ryan Hughes 24. Part of University Communications and Marketing at the University of South Florida. "Despite Democracy Concerns, Researchers Find Americans Very Interested in Election." University of South Florida News. 11-4-2024. https://www.usf.edu/news/2024/despite-democracy-concerns-researchers-find-americans-very-interested-in-election.aspx

A nationally representative survey of U.S. adults finds a public highly attuned to the 2024 election campaign. Researchers at the University of South Florida’s Center for Sustainable Democracy, in partnership with researchers at Rutgers University, the University of Minnesota and the University of Kansas, have released new survey findings to better understand attitudes about American democracy, the current election campaign, and democratic engagement with politics. According to the survey, heightened political interest and general faith in the integrity of American elections is mixed with persistent worries about whether democracy is working in the United States and the extent of social media’s influence on democratic institutions and processes. “On the eve of a nationwide election, Americans are both highly engaged with the election campaign and concerned about the current state of American democracy,” says Joshua Scacco, director of Center for Sustainable Democracy and associate professor of political communication. “The winners up and down the ballot in this election will confront a divided American public grappling with important questions about the future of democracy.” Among the survey results: More than 60% of Americans view elections as safe, secure and accessible. Four-in-five Americans report increased interest in campaigns as the election approaches. majority of Americans are dissatisfied with democracy in the United States. A third of Americans support a “strong leader” form of government who can make decisions without interference from Congress or the courts. More than 55% of Americans think that social media have a negative effect on American democracy. Around 60% of Americans report partisan rancor about the opposing political party’s aims and goals for the United States. Americans report increased interest in campaigns as election approaches. Four-in-five Americans report either being ‘very much interested’ (September: 47.4%; October: 50.5%) or ‘somewhat interested’ in the political campaigns (September: 34.8%; October: 31.8%). Respondents who are ‘very much interested’ in the campaign increased 3% between September and October.  In the September wave of the survey, there were no significant differences between Republicans and Democrats with regard to election interest. Independents were significantly less likely to be interested in the campaign. The same trend exists in the October wave of the survey. 2 | State of Democracy Survey Americans report more expressive forms of political participation, including talking to people about politics and posting on social media about the election. The survey documented little change between September and October.  Talking to people about politics (September: 73.1%; October: 69.5%)  Posting on social media about the election (September: 32.2%; October: 32.1%)  Wearing campaign-related clothing or memorabilia (September: 18.9%; October: 20.1%)  Donating to a candidate or campaign (September: 18.4%; October: 18.8%)  Attending political meetings, rallies, or dinners (September: 14.2%; October: 13.7%)  Contacting voters by canvassing, phone banking, or writing (September: 10.0%; October: 10.2%)

#### Yes link. Internal structure bad means scaling them up is bad.

#### AND they Pocket victories---American political culture prizes winning and power over principle, unions cannot serve as vehicles for real democracy. That’s Ashby.

#### It turns the case. Unions will slide into populism, making solvency impossible.

#### Think about this logically: if those workers didn’t vote to deter the clear threat to democracy of trump, they clearly don’t care enough to solve.

#### Collective action doesn’t solve democracy. There’s no union education or density because they are lazy and too institutional plus other identity factors overwhelm union political influence.

Hamilton Nolan 24. Labor writer for In These Times. “Believe It Or Not, Unions Have Even Bigger Problems than the 2024 Election.” In These Times. 10-21-2024. https://inthesetimes.com/article/union-election-trump-harris-2024-labor-pro-act-election

Here is one thing we can say for sure about union members who vote for Trump: The fact that they are union members is not the most important part of their own identity. If it were, they could be easily persuaded not to vote for Trump, a literal billionaire scab who we have already seen act like a typical anti-labor Republican during his term in the White House. Hell, J.D. Vance gave a speech opposing the PRO Act just a few days ago! The interesting question here is not whether these guys are full of shit when they ask union members for support; the interesting question is why many union members care so little about being union members that they allow themselves to be tempted into the Republican camp. Their competing identities — as macho guys, or as racists, or as anti-elites, or as Christians, or whatever — have overtaken any hold that their identity as a union member may have had on their hearts and minds. That is a problem that cannot be solved by any politicians. It can only be solved by the labor movement itself.

This trend, which has the potential to decimate the already tenuous toehold that organized labor has in Washington, is a blaring siren alerting unions that they must drastically improve on two fronts. The first is in the political education of their members. Clearly, endorsements by almost every union president are not that convincing to a significant portion of union members. Why? Well, in many cases, the unions are not democratically run, they do not frequently meet with and solicit the political input of members, and the members feel alienated from the decisions of leadership, causing them to care little for who their union president wants them to vote for.

The process of democratizing the endorsement process, though, carries with it the need for unions to act not just as workplace negotiators, but as schools—for unions to take seriously the task of saying to members, ​“We have studied these issues, we have met with politicians, we have lobbied in Washington, and here is our power analysis, and here are our friends and enemies, and here is why, and here is the path forward.” Unions need political discussion groups. Unions need book clubs. Unions need labor colleges. Unions need to embody the practice of small-d democracy, to become the natural place that their members turn to when it is time to study politics and debate politics and participate in politics. Unions need to, in essence, become their own form of civil society. Lazy, institutional, top-down unions that do not constantly work to engage members will see their members drift away and, sometimes, drift into the welcoming arms of Donald Trump (or another bullshit artist like him).

Second, and even more importantly, unions need to organize many, many new union members. Organized labor has wasted the presidential term of a friendly, pro-union president by allowing union density to decline during the time that Biden has been in office. You often hear unions bragging about the fact that public opinion polls say that their popularity is at a 60-year high. What you do not hear them bragging about is the fact that union density has dropped from 10.8% in 2020 to 10.0% today. What use is popularity if nine out of ten working people don’t even have a union? Nothing is as important to the American labor movement as turning around the decline of union density. By that metric, the past four years have been squandered. And there is no reason to think that the political landscape of the next four years will be as friendly as the years that just slipped by.

#### Worker baords are even worse.

Alexander T. MacDonald 24. Shareholder with Littler Mendelson’s Workplace Policy Institute; J.D. from the William & Mary School of Law. "Predistribution, Labor Standards, and Ideological Drift: Why Some Conservatives Are Embracing Labor Unions (and Why They Shouldn't)." Federalist Society. 9-23-2024. https://fedsoc.org/fedsoc-review/predistribution-labor-standards-and-ideological-drift-why-some-conservatives-are-embracing-labor-unions-and-why-they-shouldn-t

Second, predistribution are supposed to make workplace regulation more democratic.[108] But these new models effectively squash workplace choice. Under some sectoral laws, unions can be certified with support from only a fraction of the workforce. For example, the proposed Massachusetts law would allow a union to trigger an election with the support of only 5% of “active drivers.” [109] And it would define “active drivers” to include only drivers who have completed more than the median number of rides in the last year.[110] In other words, the law would immediately exclude half of the driver population from the selection process.[111] A tiny fraction of drivers could trigger an election.[112] And if the union won more than half of the votes actually cast, it would represent all drivers, whether they wanted a union or not.[113]

The new standards boards are even less democratic. Workers are ostensibly represented on the boards by designated board members. But workers have no say on who these members are. Instead, the members are appointed by a government official.[114] And they cannot be recalled—nor can they even be required to listen to the workers they represent. Instead, they stay in their seats until their terms expire, and they make their own decisions about what is best for workers.[115] This is not worker voice, but the absence of it.[116]

#### Opacity! It means unions can become lobbying arms instead of unique “democratic” entities.

Steven K. Ashby 22. Labor Education Program, School of Labor and Employment Relations, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign. “Union Democracy in Today’s Labor Movement”. Labor Studies Journal 2022, Vol. 47(2) 109–136

Transparency in collective bargaining means discussions between management and the union in bargaining are shared with the members. Unfortunately, the norm during labor-management negotiations, as one unionist described her local union, is that “bargaining is done completely behind closed doors. The members are never told anything during negotiations.” 56 A democratic union leadership has nothing to hide, and wants a fully informed membership.

Transparency means the leadership has no secrets from the members on a union’s political expenditures. “Open books and tight fists” is the UE phrasing—all major financial decisions are made by the membership, financial information is given to the members, the union works to ensure every expenditure of union dues is necessary, and rank-and-file trustees closely monitor union finances.57

The 2010 Citizens United decision by the Supreme Court created transparency issues in unions. The decision has been widely denounced by progressives as allowing unlimited campaign contributions to candidates from billionaires and their front groups, and for ludicrously declaring that “corporations are people” with free speech rights to unlimited spending in campaigns. Just 12 people contributed a combined $3.4 billion, 1 of 13 of all dollars donated, to federal candidates and political groups between January 2009 and December 2020, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, which tracks money in federal elections.58 Spending on campaigns skyrocketed starting in 2018. Pro-business groups gave $5.9 billion between 2018 and 2020, while labor gave $244 million, according to Opensecrets.com.59

However, a little discussed aspect of the court’s decision opened up possibilities for unions to be far less transparent to their members about the use of union dues. A 2002 law prohibited unions from using dues money for public campaigning. Rather, dues could only be used to educate their own members about the union’s electoral preferences. Publicly campaigning required using funds from a union’s political action committee. Every union asks its members to voluntarily contribute to their union’s PAC fund. The court’s decision reversed that. Unions were freed to use dues money to publicly campaign for candidates.

#### It empirically bars worker input.

César F. Rosado Marzán 23. Professor of Law, Coauthor of *Labor Law in the Contemporary Workplace: Cases and Materials*. "Quasi Tripartism: Limits of Co-Regulation and Sectoral Bargaining in the United States.” *The University of Chicago Law Review*. Vol. 90. No. 2. 3/9/2023. <https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/2023-02/12_SYMP_ROSADO.pdf>

The presence of some sort of employer participation in the sectoral bargaining cases of New York and Seattle, and their absence in the co-regulatory cases of Chicago and Los Angeles County, is likely because the former cases require some form of negotiation between parties, while the latter, being enforcement bodies, do not.224

Employers might oftentimes be a presence in coenforcement decisions without being an actual party, in the sense that their interests might be considered by government and labor regulators given employers’ capacity to destroy jobs or exit the economy altogether if enforcement becomes too onerous.225 Moreover, employers retain the authority to regulate the workplace unilaterally in areas where state regulation is absent. In this manner, tripartism under a co-enforcement model could be nominal, or quasi tripartite, rather than actual or real.

There are also limitations in the government-labor collaborations not captured in Table 1. The Chicago OLS mostly collaborates with Arise Chicago, which is just one worker advocacy group in the Windy City and which has a mere three hundred members226 in a city of 2.7 million people. The Chicago OLS still has some ground to cover to handle caseloads as large as those in Seattle and San Francisco, which are smaller cities. Hence, the reach of the Chicago OLS is narrow. It seems that they need more resources to do their work. Additionally, as of this writing, there is no available evidence of how many PHCs exist or how effectively they’re handling health and safety in Los Angeles workplaces. More research is needed to know how effective these bodies are, or if they even exist.

While the New York Board was tripartite and had employer participation, there was no requirement that it have members who represent the industry that they were attempting to set minimum wages for. The fact that no fast-food employer representative—or fast-food worker representative for that matter— was a member of the 2016 fast-food wage board is telling of the lack of representativeness of this body. In this sense, it was also a quasi-tripartite institution. The parties who were really affected by the wages it set had no bargaining authority and could not recommend terms.

Different from the New York Board, the Seattle Board has representatives of actual workers and employers in the domestic work sector. However, these representatives are appointed, not elected, so it is difficult to assert that Seattle domestic workers and employers are generally represented in the Seattle Board. In other words, while the New York Board was not a representative body, the Seattle Board is likely only limitedly so.227

### AT: Democracy---2NC

#### Im pretty sure the 2AC dropped defense.

#### No democracy impact: they’re equally likely to cause wars, and short-termism and lobbying deter effective public goods provision. Aff evidence is biased by western focus. That’s Galston.

#### Thumpers: gerrymandering races, j6, etc.

#### Beauchamp says the impact is thumpoed.

Zack Beauchamp 24, Senior Correspondent at Vox, Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting funding award recipient, author of On The Right newsletter, author of The Reactionary Spirit, "It's not alarmist: A second Trump term really is an extinction-level threat to democracy," Vox, 11/02/2024, https://www.vox.com/policy/381636/trump-2024-democracy-threat-orban-second-term

## Warming

### Impact---AT: Warming---2NC

#### The plan can’t solve warming. There’s a self-defense imperative that forces unions to prioritze economic concerns over reducing emissions. Worse, leadership is ignorant and swamped by other issues. That’s 1NC Prescod. Prefer it: it preempts aff authors and says they’re overconcerned with activist pandering and ignorant of working class concerns. It also double turns advantage one because solving inequality requires increasing economic consumption which makes warming.

#### If we win ‘unions fail’ above, it demonstrates they can’t effectuate political causes.

#### ‘Global enagement’ is eitehr thumped or impossible.

#### 1AC Block says legal barriers block solvency.

Sharon **Block 19** – Professor of Practice and the Executive Director of the Center for Labor and a Just Economy @ Harvard Law School; 12/6; On Labor, “How Labor Law Could Help – Not Hinder – Tackling Big Problems”; https://onlabor.org/how-labor-law-could-help-not-hinder-tackling-big-problems

Moreover, the law’s definition of mandatory subjects of bargaining raises questions about whether unions in our enterprise-based bargaining system can even get the climate issue to the bargaining table.

#### Sectoral bargaining halts the transition---coal, chemical, and steel sectors fight tooth and nail.

Tobias Kalt 22. PhD in political science. “Agents of transition or defenders of the status quo? Trade union strategies in green transitions.” *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 64.4, 508-510.

Union transition strategies in Germany and South Africa range from oppositional to transformative. Initially, IG BCE pursued oppositional strategies. The union opposed climate levies on coal power and was sceptical of a climate-driven phase out. Over time, IG BCE shifted from an oppositional to a reactive strategy. It accepted the need for an early phase out yet attempted to delay the transition and cushion its effects on its members. This was done by arguing for the need for coal as ‘a crucial bridging technology for the energy transition’ (IG BCE, interview). DGB, Verdi and IG Metall tend toward more affirmative strategies that support the ecological modernisation of the economy. While segments within both Verdi and IG Metall would like to see their unions pursuing more transformative transition strategies, these positions remain marginalised. In South Africa, NUMSA was at the forefront of developing transformative transition strategies already in the early 2010s. In a resolution passed at its 2012 National Congress, NUMSA demanded a socially owned renewable energy sector ‘made up of a mix of energy parastatals, cooperatives, municipal-owned entities and other forms of community energy enterprises’. COSATU pursued a similar strategy and adopted a climate change policy in 2011 that recognised that ‘climate change … is caused by the global private profit system of capitalism … (and) requires a fundamental economic and social transformation to substantially change current patterns of production and consumption’. A few years later, COSATU’s and NUMSA’s transformative strategies have taken a backseat to more reactive strategies. Together with NUM and other coal unions such as Solidarity and UASA, NUMSA supports climate action in principle but remains sceptical of phasing out coal without accompanying transition plans and is adamantly opposed to privatised renewable energy. Faced in 2017 by Eskom’s closure of coal plants without transition measures in place, NUM and NUMSA switched to oppositional strategies to try to prevent job losses in the coal sector with NUMSA going to court to prevent Eskom from buying renewable energy from independent power producers. Recently, the newly founded SAFTU, which emerged out of the split within COSATU, has taken up earlier transformative approaches, supported by radical unions such as GIWUSA. In sum, a broad range of transition strategies has been adopted throughout the conflict in South Africa and Germany. Most commonly unions move back and forth between reactive strategies that minimise costs for the unions and their members and affirmative strategies that create new opportunities in green sectors. Outright opposition to the coal transition and more transformative approaches are less frequent.

Sectoral interests

There is a strong correlation between unions’ sectoral interests and their approaches to green transitions (Table 1). In Germany, IG BCE has direct sectoral interests in coal mining and indirect sectoral interests as most of its membership is in energy-intensive chemical and steel industries that benefit from preferential access to cheap coal power. Verdi organises employees in coal power plants, though the share of members in the coal sector is very low compared to members in service sectors. In the renewable energy sector, the metalworkers’ union IG Metall is strongest. In South Africa, NUM is the main coal union that organises Black blue-collar workers in coal mines and at Eskom, while Solidarity and UASA organise mainly white white-collar workers in the sector. NUMSA as well represents employees at Eskom and recently also ventured into coal mining. As a metals and engineering union, NUMSA also has sectoral interests in a renewable energy manufacturing sector.

Table 1. Unions in energy and energy-intensive sectors in Germany and South Africa.

Germany

IG BCE Lignite mining, coal plants, chemicals, steel and manufacturing

Verdi Coal plants, municipal power utilities, power transmission and distribution

IG metal Wind and solar industries, metals, engineering, automotive

South Africa

NUM Coal sector, power utility, mining

NUMSA Coal sector, power utility, renewable energy, metals, engineering, automotive, mining

Solidarity Coal sector, power utility, mining, metals, engineering, chemicals

UASA Coal sector, power utility, mining, automotive, engineering

GIWUSA Engineering, chemicals

Unions in the coal sector have incentives to oppose or delay coal transitions due to fears of losing members and associational power. Sectoral interests are especially important if unions organise along economic sector lines, as is the case with IG BCE and NUM that are closely tied to the coal sector. In contrast, unions in renewable energy are more likely to see potentials for recruiting new members through green transitions. Notably, when unions organise in both sunset and sunrise industries, the interests of incumbents in highly unionised sectors tend to have greater weight. Incumbent interests make the shift from job-shedding to job-creating sectors difficult as one interviewee remarked regarding NUMSA’s transition strategy: ‘At the moment, the people who shape the union policy are those vested in the fossil fuel industry’.

#### Worst case, companies would offshore. There’s precedent, and union leverage doesn’t extend internationally.

#### Warming is not existential. Timescale is long, past temp spikes disprove tipping points, and models disagree with tail end risks. The plan also can’t solve it, since Chinese That’s Pethokis. Prefer it: it cites a confluence of studies.

#### Adaptation insulates society.

Adrien Bilal 25. Assistant Professor of Economics at Stanford University. “The Macroeconomics of Climate Change.” National Academies. January 31, 2025. https://www.nationalacademies.org/our-work/docs/D4D69AD2B6747593022189BE9D1F36B8A37D22C82040?noSaveAs=1

A common criticism of the canonical damage approach is that it uses short-run weather variation to identify the impact of long-run, slow-moving changes in the climate. These impacts may differ for multiple reasons: they may reflect fundamentally different changes in the climatic system, and society may adapt differently to temporary and permanent changes in the climate.

Hsiang and Deryugina (2017) structure this “weather vs. climate” debate. Using a simple envelope argument, they show that adaptation does not matter for welfare to a first order: to the extent that households or firms are already at the margin before the climate changes, the value of adaptation is nil. Of course, adaptation may still matter more for larger shocks that violate a first-order approximation, or for slow-onset adaptation. 21

Empirically, the evidence on whether adaptation to climate change impacts is taking place is mixed. Barecca et al. (2016) find a strong decline in the heat-mortality relationship in the United States that they attribute to the adoption of air conditioning. Kahn (2005) shows that mortality in richer countries is less responsive to natural disasters, and Carleton et al. (2022) find that richer countries display smaller heat-mortality sensitivities. All papers interpret their results as evidence of adaptation.

#### Turn: Corporate growth drives a steady transition now but the plan strands trillions.

Dayana Madeira Nogueira 25. Professor in Administration and Accounting Sciences at Estácio de Sá University, in addition to having worked as an instructor for Management courses (accounting, administration and logistics) at SENAC RJ. “Energy Transition: a Look as Stranded Assets.” The Extractive Industries and Society. Expected June 2025. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214790X25000024

Semieniuk et al. (2022) estimated that the value of global stranded assets, particularly in the upstream oil and gas sector, exceeds USD 1 trillion, based on anticipated policy shifts to reduce fossil fuel dependence. This substantial amount represents the present value of future lost profits as fossil fuel assets become less viable. Zhao et al. (2023), based on the data of China's A-share listed companies in the high-carbon industry from 1998 to 2021, show that (1) climate transition risks are a significant cause of stranded corporate fossil energy assets; (2) the stranded risk of Chinese companies’ fossil energy assets has been oscillating upward over the past two decades; (3) the stranded risk has increased significantly after the “double carbon” target.

Abraham-Dukuma (2021) suggests that mainstream oil and gas companies have great potential to transition to clean energy portfolios by optimizing organizational steering, technical leverage, and intra- and inter-industry synergies. However, policy support from petroleum-producing host states remains pivotal to the success of “oil and gas majors transitioning.” Tagliapietra (2019) shows that, with half of the world's known oil and gas reserves, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is a cornerstone of the global energy architecture and that the worldwide transition to a low-carbon economy presents critical challenges for MENA oil and gas producers, as their development models are heavily reliant on hydrocarbon revenues. This transition poses a long-term threat to the sustainability of these models.

#### Sectoral bargaining units lobby for and glorify unsustainable industries, stifling worker power---presumption.

LNS 14. The Labor Network for Sustainability (LNS) is an organization whose mission is to be the organized voice within the labor movement for policies that are ecologically sustainable. “The Labor-Climate Landscape: A Guided Tour for Worker- and Climate-Protection Advocates.” https://www.labor4sustainability.org/articles/the-labor-climate-landscape-a-guided-tour-for-worker-and-climate-protection-advocates/

Organized labor’s approach to climate change has been primarily employment based. Unions like the green job gains from climate protection measures; but they fear the potential job losses from phasing out carbon-fueled industries. This should not be surprising since unions are organized primarily to look after the specific employment interests of workers.

Even the most far sighted trade union leaders have a very difficult job: They must represent the immediate interests of existing members, some of whom may face job losses in the transition to a low carbon economy, while keeping in mind the longer term economic, social, and ecological concerns.

But a narrow focus on the short term has led some unions to neglect the longer-term effects of climate change on jobs, workers, and their communities and the action needed to address them. Unless labor develops a full-fledged response to climate change, it is likely to be left by the roadside in what will be the pivotal challenge of the 21st century.

While unions are bargaining opponents of their employers over wages and working conditions, they have a long tradition of building alliances with them over public policy issues that affect growth in their sectors. This too often leads unions to follow the narrow self-interest of their industry instead of developing independent positions representing the interests of labor as a whole.

A striking example is the UAW’s long alliance with the big car companies in opposition to strong fuel economy standards – a policy which contributed not only to carbon emissions but to the near-collapse of the American auto industry. Such shortsighted sectoral alliances can be a significant obstacle to drawing labor into the climate change fight.

Although labor’s response has often been confused and contradictory, there is a growing awareness that re-tooling the energy and transportation infrastructure and retrofitting existing buildings to make them more energy efficient can both save the planet and create a new sustainable economy that will benefit all. One illustration of that change is the UAW’s support (along with ten auto companies) for more stringent fuel economy standards.

A stumbling block for labor in addressing climate change is the attitude that “we never met a job we didn’t like.” This uncritical advocacy of any and all jobs tempts unions to support projects that are inherently anti-social and against the interest of working people in general – for example, extreme energy projects like fracking, tar sands development and pipelines, and deep off-shore oil drilling. It also tempts unions to oppose climate protection measures that are essential for the future of humanity – including American workers – but may result in the loss of some jobs.

This approach can lead to another stumbling block – a dubious definition of solidarity. Solidarity is organized labor’s supreme value for a simple reason: Workers can influence their conditions of labor only if they support each other. “An injury to one is an injury to all” is the most fundamental union principle; Solidarity Forever is its most famous anthem. But solidarity can be abused when one group of workers demands that others support them even when the result is catastrophic for other working people and for humanity as a whole. Organized labor only defeats its own underlying reason for existence if it advocates wars to increase war jobs, criminalization to increase prison jobs, and fossil fuel energy to increase extraction, pipeline, and power plant jobs. Solidarity for limited groups can tear the labor movement apart unless it is coordinated with the interests of other workers and humanity as a whole.

#### Empirics prove.

Debra Kahn et al. 20. California policy editor at POLITICO. Samantha Maldonado, POLITICO New Jersey’s energy and environment reporter. Catherine Boudreau. "Unions fracture over climate." POLITICO. 9-1-2020. https://www.politico.com/newsletters/the-long-game/2020/09/01/unions-fracture-over-climate-490237

A DIVIDED MOVEMENT — Organized labor is often viewed as a cheerleader for the left, helping shape the agendas of Democratic lawmakers. But in statehouses from coast to coast and at the national level, unions have had no problem blocking green initiatives if they decide they’re not in their members’ interests.

Those who stand to lose the most from tightening environmental policies have been wielding their power the past few months to kill proposals in statehouses across the country. Broadly, the split among unions is most marked between trade unions whose jobs are tied to the fossil fuel industry and those representing the service sector, like health care, government and custodial workers.

“In recent years, the public employees have been siding mostly with the environmentalists and the private sector have been siding with our opinion, which is yes, we’re pro-environment but ... we also want to be able to afford to live here and have jobs here,” said Kate Gibbs, deputy director of the Engineers Labor-Employer Cooperative, a trades union.

Environmental protection and union jobs are a fault line among Democrats, which will only be magnified nationwide if Joe Biden defeats President Donald Trump in November. Biden will be under pressure from the left to enact major climate action similar to the “Green New Deal,” which many national labor union leaders oppose. The Democratic National Committee last month scrapped language in its platform calling for an end to fossil fuel tax breaks and subsidies, despite Biden’s campaign arguing the move would ultimately benefit unions.

If Joe Biden wins in November, he will be under pressure to enact major climate action similar to the Green New Deal, which many national labor union leaders oppose.

Take California, where Democrats dominate state government. In a recent tug of war over the blue-collar constituency, the unions proved decisive. Electrical and ironworkers, pipe fitters, boilermakers and construction workers, along with oil companies and the state Chamber of Commerce, persuaded three Democratic senators to vote against a bill that would have mandated no-drill zones around certain populous areas — killing the effort for the year.

“We’ve got a little bit stronger voice for working people than most other people,” said Robbie Hunter, president of the State Building and Construction Trades Council of California, the parent organization for 160 local unions that represent 400,000 workers across more than a dozen different trades, which spearheaded opposition to the bill.

In Pennsylvania, Democratic state lawmakers were recently frustrated by AFL-CIO, Building Trades and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers’ support of a bill that would block the state from joining the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a cap-and-trade program to reduce emissions from the power sector.

### AT: Supply Chain---2NC

#### No supply chains impact.

#### The 1AC is about reseilence but their impact card is a rand guy whose worried abt chinese authoritty over chains.

#### Yes impact to dependence on china, because your martin evidence says that makes attacks inevitable and causes extinction.

#### They are resilient. Covid thumps and proves doomsayers wrong. Firms create redundancies and backups. That’s Drezner

#### Local sourcing and substitution solve.

Dilek Ozdemir 22 et al. Mahak Sharma, Amandeep Dhir, and Tugrul Daim; February 2022; Assistant Professor at Izmir Katip Celebi University, Ph.D. from Istanbul Technical University; Researcher at the National Institute of Industrial Engineering, Ph.D. from the National Institute of Industrial Engineering; Professor of Research Methods at the University of Agder, Ph.D. from the University of Helsinki; Professor at Portland State University, Ph.D. from Portland State University; Technology in Society, “Supply chain resilience during the COVID-19 pandemic,” vol. 68]

Understanding the effectiveness of existing practices must figure prominently on the agenda of the supply chain literature in the face of the pandemic. Our second main finding indicates that both proactive and reactive resilience-building activities have enhanced supply chain velocity during the pandemic. Studying the effect of supply chain risk management on supply chain resilience and robustness, El Baz and Ruel [102] report similar results. Examining supply chains of essential goods, Sodhi et al. assert that traditional approaches, such as redundancies, can be effective during pandemics [103]. Sharma and her colleagues state that focusing on resilience not only helps during pandemics but also exerts positive long-term effects on supply chain viability [104]. While noting that companies have applied multiple practices, Woong and Goh [105] identify ‘increasing capacity’, ‘diversifying single-product categories’, ‘local sourcing’, ‘prioritising critical categories’, ‘repurposing assets’, ‘establishing partnerships’ and ‘leveraging social media influence’ as the most common supply chain risk management practices. Consistent with our findings, they suggest that both proactive and reactive strategies have helped companies to overcome problems in their supply chains. Although these findings are valuable, the area remains open to additional investigation.

Highly contradicting findings and diverse perspectives exist in the pandemic-era supply chain literature. Nevertheless, we know that the pandemic has affected every industry differently; thus, no one-size-fits-all solution exists. The extant literature on supply chain resilience in the pandemic context emphasises the need to think outside the box. Supply chains must be reconsidered and redesigned to enhance their viability [37,48,101,[104], [105], [106]]. Our results reveal that existing resilience-building approaches are effective but insufficient.

We also know that the pandemic has changed every aspect of life. Some of these changes will persist in the post-pandemic period, while others will be discarded as soon as possible [107,108]. In any case, people, firms and supply chains will continue to face new demands and new concerns that require innovativeness. Thus, post-pandemic markets may include highly innovative actors [109] who have experience in failing supply chains. We predict that the supply chain management discipline is poised to enter an extremely innovative era, whose seeds the pandemic has sown. Our findings clearly demonstrate the crucial role of innovation in resilience building. Therefore, the next step should be qualitative analyses of success and failure stories to gather in-depth information and identify the critical decisions that brought failure and the critical innovations that produced success. We suggest that future researchers concentrate on qualitative studies to accumulate insights useful for building more resilient supply chains.

6. Conclusions

Supply chain failures during the COVID-19 pandemic motivated researchers to re-examine supply chains from a resilience-building perspective. Our study makes the following contributions to this end:

1. We adopted supply chain velocity as a measure of supply chain resilience and attempted to understand the factors that impact it.
2. We demonstrated that both proactive and reactive approaches have promoted supply chain resilience. Innovation seems an effective way to avoid or at least mitigate the pandemic's devastating effects.